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1. Introduction  
During the 1990s, tax arrears have played a significant role as indirect subsidies to 
firms in Russia and were one of the major contributors to a substantial reduction of in the 
size of government. Between 1993 and 1998 total tax debt to consolidated Russia’s 
budget grew from 1.8 to 9.6 and tax revenues to the consolidated budget fell from 25.5 to 
20.7 percent of annual GDP.1 Figure 1 shows that stock of tax arrears to the consolidated 
budget went up steadily from the beginning of 1995 until March 1998 reaching the level 
of about 35 percent of quarterly GDP and, then, fell. Arrears to the federal budget 
accumulated almost with the same pace as the total stock of arrears up to March 1998 and 
stabilized after that. In March 1998, federal tax arrears accounted for two thirds of the 
total tax arrears. Calculations support the visual impression that federal tax arrears have 
grown faster and declined slower than regional arrears in the second half of 1990s: on 
average 60% of an increase in arrears to the consolidated budget was driven by an 
increase in arrears to the federal budget; and only 40% of a drop in arrears to the 
consolidated budget was due to a decrease in the federal budget arrears (the difference 
between the two figures is statistically significant). This paper aims at studying the nature 
of this phenomenon. 
[Place Figure 1 here.] 
There have been several empirical studies of determinants of tax arrears in Russia. 
Using survey data on Russian enterprises, Alfandari and Schaffer (1996) found that in the 
early 1990s financially distressed firms had considerably higher tax arrears compared to 
financially solvent firms. Schaffer (1996) agued that arrears propagate: an increase in the 
inter-enterprise arrears led to a significant increase in tax arrears and wage arrears. These 
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papers show that liquidity problems were important in determining tax arrears in the first 
half of the 1990s. In a later study, Schaffer (1998) confirmed that tax authorities did not 
force penalties on loss-making firms for not paying taxes and conjectured that tax arrears 
arise as the result of firms’ lobbying. 
An explanation for why the federal government was less successful in tax 
collection than regional governments was suggested by Shleifer and Treisman, 2000; 
Treisman, 2000; Cai and Treisman, 2004; Lambert-Mogiliansky et al., 2003; and Sonin, 
2003. These works argue that politically strong governors protected firms in their regions 
from the federal tax collectors through the capture of local branches of federal courts and 
tax collection agencies.2 
Scholars of fiscal intergovernmental relations in Russia point out that the 1990s 
were characterized by an enormous shift towards higher degree of de-facto 
decentralization with gradual but dramatic loss of the federal control over regional 
policies and finances. This de-facto decentralization was not accompanied by appropriate 
changes to initial the de-jure central command over subnational budgets.3 Shleifer and 
Treisman (2000) were the first to associate strengthening of regional political and fiscal 
powers vis-à-vis the federal center with shortfalls in federal tax revenues and growth of 
fiscal imbalances in the second half of 1990s. Motivated by ideas of the Shleifer and 
Treisman’s book, Cai and Treisman (2004) developed a Tiebout-like formal model of 
inter-regional competition in attracting capital by providing protection of from federal tax 
collectors. The model shows that accumulation of federal tax arrears, indeed, can be 
                                                                                                                                                 
1 Data source is Treisman (2000). 
2 Black et al. (2000), OECD (2000), and Lavrov et al. (2001) provide evidence of regional political 
influence on regional brunches of federal agencies, including the tax ministry. 
3 For the best available surveys of development of Russia’s federalism see OECD (2000) and Lavrov et al. 
(2001). Treisman (2000) provides aggregate data on dynamics of consolidated revenues and tax arrears. 
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explained by the regional protectionist policies of politically strong governors. Sonin 
(2003) provided another testable hypothesis about the determinants of regional protection 
from paying federal taxes. He built a model of interactions between a regional governor 
and a benevolent federal tax enforcer to show that the industrial structure of regional 
economies and the ability of governors to extract rents from regional enterprises are 
important determinants of the extent of regional protection. 
Using regional-level data on tax debt, Treisman (2000) attempted to put the 
hypothesis about the regional protection nature of tax arrears to test. He found some, 
albeit very weak, evidence in support of the conjecture that tax arrears were a result of 
political and fiscal interactions of the regional and federal authorities. In particular, 
presence of very large enterprises in the region significantly increased regional tax debt 
and so did newly elected communist governor (other political variables turned out to be 
insignificant). The absence of firm-level data precluded Treisman from drawing definite 
conclusions about the nature of arrears because it did not allow controlling for financial 
performance of firms. It is particularly important because previous literature named 
financial distress a primary source of federal arrears (Alfandari and Schaffer, 1996 and 
Schaffer, 1996). 
Federal tax arrears and bailouts of non-paying firms in the form of authorized tax 
deferrals may arise also because federal governments, that can enforce tax collection, 
have incentives not to do so.4 In particular, we look at whether the Russian federal 
government used tax arrears and deferrals to redistribute income towards regions, where 
                                                 
4 Tax deferral is an official permission given to a particular firm by tax authorities to postpone payment of 
certain amount of taxes due. There was a sequence of mass authorized tax deferrals that took place in 1994, 
1996 and 1997. Ivanova and Wyplozs (1998) used time-series data to show that official deferrals in tax 
payments caused tax arrears to go up. They also provided evidence of strategic behavior of enterprises in 
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it faces tougher electoral competition on national elections as Lindbeck and Weibull 
(1987) and Dixit and Londregan (1995 and 1998) argue and if there is any evidence of 
pure form of income redistribution which implies that taxes are enforced more strictly in 
richer than in poorer regions. 
Treisman's empirical study (2000) is most closely related to this paper: essentially 
this paper revisits the same hypothesis. The advantage of our approach rests on 
availability of micro-level data. Firm-level data allow us to differentiate empirically 
between the alternative hypotheses at the regional and firm level: regional resistance to 
paying federal taxes, implicit redistributive federal subsidies to firms, and the lack of 
liquidity (financial distress) of firms. In particular, we test empirical relevance of the 
regional protection story after controlling for liquidity at the firm level. 
We find that both lack of liquidity in firms and governor’s political resistance to 
federal tax collection were important in determining federal arrears. Liquidity problems 
in firms explain a large part of variation in the flow and stock of tax arrears. In addition, 
for a given level of liquidity, federal arrears accumulated faster and authorized tax 
deferrals were more frequent in regions where governors had larger popular base, regions 
that had better bargaining position vis-à-vis the center, and regions, where the governor 
was in political opposition to the center. Contrary to the premise of redistribute politics 
paradigm, there is no evidence that regions where the incumbent had a “close race” in the 
presidential elections had higher level of arrears. These results explain why federal tax 
arrears accumulated faster than regional arrears. In contrast, authorized tax deferrals 
granted by the federal government exhibit a pattern that is consistent with the story of 
federal government buying off “swing” voters: in regions where the vote for the 
                                                                                                                                                 
accumulation of tax arrears: enterprises correctly predicted that the policy of granting deferrals was 
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incumbent president and the opposition candidate were closer, deferrals were more 
frequent. However, a part of federal deferrals were granted because regional governors 
were successfully bargaining for federal deferrals on behalf of regional companies. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents testable hypotheses 
motivated by alternative theories of the nature of federal tax arrears. Section 3 describes 
the data and empirical methodology. Section 4 presents results. The conclusions follow in 
Section 5. 
 
2. Nature of Tax Arrears: Testable Hypotheses 
Lack of Liquidity 
Many Russian enterprises, profitable according to their books, did not have 
liquidity to finance their profit tax obligations because they were involved in barter 
chains (Guriev and Ickes, 2000) and inter-enterprise arrears (OECD, 2000). In addition, 
genuinely loss-making enterprises accumulated tax obligations that they were unable to 
meet: a large part of federal tax liabilities were independent of enterprise performance 
characteristics, e.g., payroll and revenue taxes. Thus, literature named liquidity problems 
in firms the most natural cause of tax arrears in the 1990s (see, for instance, Schaffer, 
1996). Henceforth, we denote this explanation lack of liquidity (LL) hypothesis.  
 Liquidity problems alone may explain the difference in dynamic patterns of 
federal and regional arrears that this paper aims at explaining because regional and local 
governments often accepted in-kind contributions towards subnational taxes (i.e., public 
work of firm’s employees, paving roads, provision of housing, sports and cultural 
                                                                                                                                                 
persistent over time and accumulated tax arrears in expectation of future deferrals. 
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facilities to local population) whereas the federal government required cash payments 
(Litwack, 2002).  
We measure scope of firms’ liquidity problems by the absolute, quick, and current 
liquidity ratios as well as the relative size of overdue receivables (details are given below 
in the methodology section). If liquidity constraints are binding, we expect negative 
correlation between liquidity measures and federal tax arrears. Since our liquidity 
measures are based on accounting statements of firms, the fact that the measures indicate 
low liquidity may just reflect the endogenous outcomes of firm’s tax evasion because 
managers can use improper accounting to hide revenues from tax collectors. With the 
available data it is impossible to differentiate between real and forged liquidity problems. 
Thus, we may overstate the importance of lack of liquidity as a cause of tax arrears.  
 
Regional Resistance 
Arrears may arise not only because firms do not have liquidity to pay taxes due. It 
is possible that while firms are able to pay taxes and the federal government wants to 
enforce tax collection, arrears accumulate because the federal government lacks 
instruments for enforcement. Shleifer and Treisman (2000) suggested that this was the 
reason for the fall in federal revenues and rise in federal tax arrears between 1995 and 
1998. Federal tax collection efforts were impaired because agents who carry out tax 
collection and enforcement in the regions (formally federal employees) as well as 
regional judiciary (formally independent) were often under control of regional 
governments. Lavrov et al. wrote “federal organs operating in the regions typically have 
close relations with the regional administration, depending on the latter for a number of 
reasons, sometimes even for the provision of office space. Federal organs in the regions 
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are typically staffed by local officials with a background in the regional administration. 
Until recently, the regional governor had informal veto power over the selection of some 
federal representatives, most notably the head of the tax ministry” (2001 p.14). It is 
important that tax and treasury officials from the regional branches of these federal 
agencies usually viewed position in the regional administration as the best possible 
continuation of their carriers. 
There are several reasons for why regional governments may want to provide 
protection to firms in their regions from paying federal taxes. They may want to attract 
profitable firms to their regions with de-facto favorable tax levels in order to bust 
regional employment or for purely fiscal reasons. Moreover, regional governments may 
increase their own tax collections by withholding federal taxes because the federal and 
regional tax bases overlap. Other foundations of regional resistance to paying federal 
taxes are corruption and state capture. It could be cheaper and more feasible for firms to 
bribe the regional authorities compared to the federal government. The same can be true 
if special relationships of business to government are not based on bribes and, instead, 
firms use other methods of political influence. 
OECD Economic Survey on Russia (2000) reported that threats of regional 
governments to withhold federal share of tax revenues in the region as well as issuance of 
official instructions to regional branches of tax collection agencies on how to do it were 
quite common. In addition, Tatarstan, Bashkorkostan, Sakha-Yakutia, and Chechnia 
regions proved that direct withholdings of federal taxes were possible. The report states, 
however, that many of these threats were not implemented and it is not clear whether they 
were credible. Lambert-Mogiliansky et al. (2003) showed that bankruptcy law of 1998 
was frequently used by many regional governors to protect large regional enterprises 
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from paying federal taxes. 
We refer to the explanation that the shortfall in federal tax collection was caused 
by opportunistic behavior of federal agents in the regions as regional resistance (RR) 
hypothesis. This hypothesis generates several predictions: First, one can look at whether 
regional governors were in political opposition to the federal center. Governors that were 
loyal to Yeltsin and relied on federal governments’ political support during elections 
were less likely to engage in regional resistance to paying federal taxes because this was 
likely to spoil their relationship with the president. Second, more popular governors were 
likely to have lower costs of capturing federal tax agents based in their regions because of 
these agents’ career concerns:  Since governors with broader political base were more 
likely to win the next elections, they could more credibly promise positions in the 
regional administration if opportunistic federal agents get fired. Third, higher 
concentration within the industrial sector in the region increases incentives of regional 
authorities to protect firms because concentration usually indicates closeness of ties 
between regional governor and largest industrial enterprises (Slinko et al., 2003); and 
higher rents can be extracted from the largest enterprises in regions with higher 
concentration (Sonin, 2003). Fourth, regions that protect their firms from paying federal 
taxes should not depend on federal transfers as the main source of financing of public 
expenditure (instead they should have relatively high percentage of expenditures covered 
by own sources of revenues).5 Otherwise, the federal government can fight regional 
resistance by cutting transfers in regions that engage in capture of federal tax collectors. 
And finally, regions that have history of violations of federal laws by regional legislation 
most probably have very strong bargaining position vis-à-vis the center and, therefore, 
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they are more likely to credibly threaten the center with withholding its revenues. 
We use indirect measures of political relationships between the center and the 
regional authorities because we were unable to find variables that directly measure 
regional characteristics needed to test some of outlined predictions. The best available 
proxies for loyalty of the regional governor to the federal center and violations of federal 
legislation by the regional legislation were the two independently constructed composite 
indices that evaluate relationships of governors and the center. We discuss construction 
and use of all variables in the next section. 
 
Federal Financing 
An alternative explanation for accumulation of federal tax arrears is that the 
federal government did not have any problems enforcing tax collection (unlike RR 
hypothesis suggests) but it simply did not want to enforce tax payments in some 
enterprises. Governments may have incentives not to enforce tax collection because 
tolerating tax arrears can serve as an effective instrument of subsidizing firms. In 
particular, tax arrears are more feasible to politicians compared to giving out direct 
subsidies when governments are cash constrained or the law prohibits direct subsidies. In 
this case, politicians may choose to tolerate, delay, or write off tax arrears instead of 
liquidating non-paying firms or forcing them to pay. The reasons for subsidizing firms 
have been extensively studied in the literature.6 Politicians at all levels of government 
may have incentives to subsidize firms in exchange for maintaining inefficiently high 
employment (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994; and Kornai, 1980) and bribes (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1993) or because they cannot commit not to do it if subsidies are ex-post 
                                                                                                                                                 
5 Treisman (1997) studied the determinants of the distribution of federal transfers across regions. 
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efficient even when they are associated with large ex-ante inefficiencies (Maskin and Xu, 
2001). The motive for ex-post subsidization can be both political (when governments fear 
political costs of liquidation of large firms) and financial (when governments can get 
taxes after they have re-financed failing firms). 
If the federal and regional governments had the same structure of incentives to 
subsidize large firms by means of tax arrears independently of each other, there would 
either be no difference in federal and regional tax collection or regional tax enforcement 
would be smaller, in aggregate. This is because some large regional enterprises that are 
very important politically at the regional level may turn out to be rather small and 
unimportant from the point of view of the federal government.  
We, however, aim at explaining the opposite pattern of divergence in federal and 
regional arrears. Federal governments may wish to subsidize firms in excess to subsidies 
given out by regional governments because it may have strong incentives for 
redistribution. If federal governments do not have a better mechanism of redistribution, 
tax arrears may be used. Pure form of income redistribution implies that the federal 
government would enforce tax collection more strictly in richer than in poorer regions. 
Redistribute politics paradigm (Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987 and Dixit and Londregan, 
1995 and 1998) argues that the federal government would redistribute towards regions, 
where it faces tougher electoral competition on the national elections and many voters are 
undecided between casting votes for incumbent or opposition. Thus, if we compare 
similar firms in different regions, we should observe higher federal tax arrears in firms 
located in regions with smaller gross regional product (GRP) per capita and/or regions 
                                                                                                                                                 
6 See Roland (2000) for a great survey of this literature. 
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that had closer races on the Russia’s presidential elections. We call this explanation 
federal financing (FF) hypothesis. 7  
Data on distribution of authorized tax deferrals across firms allow us to test 
hypotheses further. If tax arrears are a result of a deliberate federal redistribution policy, 
official deferrals should be more frequent in economically weaker regions and regions 
with closer races on national elections. If tax arrears are a result of regional governors’ 
resistance, higher deferrals should be observed in regions where the governor is in open 
opposition to the federal center and regions that have better bargaining power vis-à-vis 
the center. 
It is worth noting that the hypotheses considered here are not mutually exclusive. 
It is possible that all three hypotheses are relevant in explaining a part of federal tax 
arrears. We can only investigate what is the prevailing nature of federal arrears and 
deferrals. The question that interests us the most is whether regional economic and 
political factors matter for determining the scope of arrears for a given level of firms’ 
liquidity. 
 
3. Data, variables, and empirical methodology 
Data sources and the sample 
 The Russian Tax Ministry supplied us with two lists containing firm-level data: 
one with information on stock of federal tax arrears on January 1, 1997 and flow of 
authorized federal tax deferrals on April 1, 1997; and the other with the same information 
for 1998. The lists overlap for about five hundred companies. The selection criteria were 
                                                 
7 Note that redistribution motive for federal arrears is consistent with on average less strict federal 
(compared to regional) tax enforcement. 
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not carefully specified by tax ministry officials but they claimed that “the sample in each 
year is close to a random draw” from the lists of the largest debtors to the federal budget 
in the 1996 and 1997. 
  We merged these lists of companies to the Russian Enterprise Registry 
Longitudinal Data Base (RERLD), which contains statistical data for large and medium-
size Russian enterprises.8 The resulting data set contains 863 firms in 1997 and 1,374 
firms in 1998.9 In addition, to this data set we merged several financial indicators from 
the accounting statements of firms provided by Goskomstat (Russia’s Official Statistical 
Agency) and regional level data for 73 out of 89 Subjects of the Russian Federation. This 
reduced our sample further to 776 firms in 1997 and 1,254 firms in 1998. Regional data 
come from Goskomstat with the exception of two indices that characterize political 
relationships between the federal government and regional governors. These indices were 
independently constructed by the Urban Institute and the MFK Renaissance. In addition, 
for the 476 companies (present in both lists) that accumulated arrears in 1997, we 
constructed variable indicating the flow of federal arrears. The resulting sample consists 
of big industrial firms. Distributions of firms in our sample across industries and regions 
are presented in tables A1 and A2 in the appendix. Table A3 provides summary statistics 
for federal tax arrears and authorized tax deferrals. 
 
Empirical methodology and description of variables 
To test hypotheses described in the previous section, we ran three series of cross-
section firm-level regressions. First, we estimate the following set of regressions for the 
stock of arrears in the beginning of 1997 and 1998 separately: 
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First thing to note is that, although, the sample consists mostly of very large firms, 
the variation in size is very high. Thus, it is important to normalize financial variables 
(e.g., stock and flow of arrears, overdue receivables) by a proxy of enterprise size. We 
normalize these variables by the value of nominal output. Second, since we aim at 
analyzing tax arrears the most important control variable should be the amount of taxes 
due. We do not have these data for the whole sample, however (only few firms reported 
amount of tax obligations in their balance sheets). The closest proxy for the amount of tax 
obligations available for a sufficient number of firms turned out to be the value of 
enterprise output.10 Thus, our normalization controls for the amount of taxed due. 
ratioLiquidity_  stands for the absolute, quick, or current liquidity ratio - standard 
accounting measures of liquidity. We take absolute liquidity ratio (equal to cash over 
short term liabilities) as our baseline measure because it has the largest number of 
observations and unlike the other liquidity ratios does not have trade credits in the 
numerator. In the special Russian case, trade credits may be not a sign of shortly coming 
liquidity, instead they may indicate that the enterprise was forced into a chain of inter-
enterprise arrears. Nonetheless, we verify that the baseline results received with absolute 
liquidity ratio are robust to using other liquidity ratios.  is a 
direct measure of whether enterprise is a part of an inter-enterprise arrears chain. 
outputceivables/Overdue_re
                                                                                                                                                 
8 Detailed information on how the RERLD was constructed is given in Brown and Brown (1999). 
9 Few companies from these lists have arrears or deferrals data missing.  
10 Initially we tried to predict the federal tax obligations for the firms in our sample, by 1) estimating the 
equation of determinants of federal tax obligations for a smaller set of firms that reported tax obligations 
data, and 2) calculating the predicted tax obligations for the whole set of our firms with the fitted values. 
We, however, found that the value of output is the best predictor of taxes due and, thus, dropped this two-
stage procedure. 
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Unfortunately, data on overdue receivables are scarce, so that inclusion of this variable in 
the regression reduced the number of observations by about forty percent. Thus, as a 
baseline we report regression results without this variable. Again, the baseline results for 
liquidity as well as other explanatory variables are robust to inclusion of overdue 
receivables as additional regressor. 
comppolFed __  is a measure of federal political competition. It is important for 
FF hypothesis because this measure reflects political motives for federal redistribution. It 
is equal to the negative of the absolute value of the difference between the votes for the 
incumbent presidential candidate, Yeltsin, and his opponent, Zuganov, in the second tour 
of the Russia’s presidential elections in 1996. 
ol_powerGovernor_p  (stands for governor’s political power) is the label for three 
variables that we include into the regressions in turn: the percentage of votes for the 
governor in the first tour of the last regional elections; and two indices that characterize 
the nature of relationship between the federal and regional authorities.  
The first index measures tensions of relationships between the governor and the 
federal center in 1997 (higher value means higher tension in relationships). It was 
constructed by the former investment group MFK Renaissance. This index summarizes 
information on the frequency of public statements by the governor personally against 
president Yeltsin and against Yeltsin’s policies; the level of political support of the 
governor by the center during the last regional elections (with the negative sign), and the 
presence of a bilateral treaty between the region and the center. As we discussed in the 
previous section, if the regional governor is in opposition to the federal center and does 
not rely on federal political support during regional elections, regional resistance to 
federal tax collection is more likely.  
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The second index proxies for the strength of the bargaining power of the region 
with the federal center in 1996 (higher values mean stronger bargaining position of the 
region). This index was constructed by the Urban Institute in Moscow 
(http://www.urbaneconomics.ru/eng/index.php). The first component of this index 
summarizes the information about violations of federal laws by regional legislation and 
regulations. This component should have unambiguous effect on regional resistance 
because it reflects the lack of federal control in the region. The second component is a 
measure of regional natural resource possessions. As far as natural resource possessions 
are concerned, their effect is ambiguous, because, on the one hand, natural resources give 
governors additional bargaining power vis-à-vis the center which would help regional 
resistance, on the other hand, companies that export natural resources are very large and 
likely to bargain directly with the federal governments rather than use regional 
governments for protection. Natural resource exporters have strong incentives to invest in 
their relationship with the federal government because most of natural resource taxes are 
collected by federal customs at the boarder rather than by tax collectors inside the 
regions.11 The third component of the index is the evaluation of whether regional 
population votes against or for the federal policies during national elections. On the one 
hand, it would be politically less costly for the regional governor to obstruct federal tax 
collection if the population of the region votes against the federal policies (which is in 
line with regional resistance story). On the other hand, this component of the index is 
correlated with the closeness of the race of the incumbent and opposition at the national 
elections (which is relevant for the federal redistributive financing). We control for the 
                                                 
11 Controlling for the natural resource potential or export of natural resources directly in order to eliminate 
this ambiguity does not change our baseline results. The coefficients of the resource potential variables are 
insignificant in all regressions. 
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closeness of the race at the national elections, however. Thus, this index also serves as a 
proxy for regional resistance.12  
Regional own tax revenues as a share of total regional expenditures, 
, proxies for the scale of dependence of regional budgets on 
federal transfers (important for RR hypothesis). All proxies for governors’ political 
power and the regional own revenue share are highly correlated (which proves that all of 
them essentially measure the same thing – bargaining power of the region vis-à-vis the 
center). Thus, we include these variables in regressions one by one.13  
evenue_sharReg_own_re
Log of GRP per capita is included in all regressions as a proxy for regional 
income (that might be relevant for income redistribution under the FF hypothesis). 
Concentration of output among the largest non-state industrial enterprises in the region is 
included to test Sonin’s (2003) prediction (RR hypothesis). To make concentration 
comparable across regions, it is measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman measure 
calculated among ten largest non-state regional firms. 
We use the following control variables: dummy for electricity suppliers, dummy 
for regional election in the preceding year, log of geographical distance to Moscow from 
the region where the firm is located, dummy for the military sector, and dummies for 2-
digit industries. Military and electricity enterprises have special relationships to the 
federal government; thus, they may enjoy special treatment by the federal tax 
authorities.14 2-digit industry dummies are included because taxability of firms in 
different industries differs for technological reasons (Gehlbach, 2003). Distance from the 
                                                 
12 The baseline results do not change if we control for Yeltsin’s political popularity in the regions. 
13 The results do not change much if we include the share of own revenues in all regressions. 
14 Electricity companies were paid by the federal government (by tolerating tax arrears) for channeling 
subsidies to politically important firms in the form of low energy prices. Military firms depend on the 
federal government for orders. 
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capital of the region to Moscow is an important control because whenever the federal 
government has limited resources for enforcement of tax collection, it chooses to collect 
taxes where it is cheaper to do so (i.e., closer to the center).  
Both regional and federal elections can affect incentives of the federal 
government for redistribution as well as incentives of the regional government for 
protection from the federal taxes. In particular, predictions about the regional incentives 
for capture of federal agents in the regions can be weakened substantially in times of 
gubernatorial elections because the federal political support during election campaigns 
can be very helpful for incumbent governors. On the other hand, governors that do not 
count on federal support during regional elections may intensify protection because it 
brings additional revenue to the region. The federal government’ political incentives also 
change in the face of elections because political motive for redistribution is much 
stronger in the face of elections. 1996 was the year of presidential elections and elections 
of regional governors in many of the Federation Subjects. Few regional elections also 
took place in 1997. Thus, we separately run regressions for the arrears in the beginning of 
1997 and of 1998 to control for federal elections and include dummies for regional 
election in the previous year to control for regional elections.  
All independent variables in regressions for arrears in the beginning of 1997 are 
taken in 1996 (with the exception of the index of tensions of relationships between the 
governor and the federal center which is only available in 1997); and in regressions for 
arrears in the beginning of 1998 independent variables are for 1997 or 1996 depending on 
data availability.15 Endogeneity is a serious issue in the regressions described above, even 
though we lag all except one explanatory variable, because the dependent variables are 
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stocks and we do not have information on when these stocks were accumulated. 
Unfortunately, we do not have appropriate instruments. Therefore, we also run a series of 
similar cross-section regressions for the flow of arrears accumulated in 1997 normalized 
by the level of firm’s output. 
iiiii
iiii
ControlstrationReg_ConcenGRP_pcLogcomppolFedevenue_sharReg_own_re
ol_powerGovernor_poutputceivables/Overdue_reLogratioLiquidity_ow/outputArrears_flLog
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+
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 (2) 
476 firms in which the stock of arrears increased during 1997 are included in this 
estimation. There are, however, another 120 firms that have observations for the 
beginning of both 1997 and 1998, but their arrears decreased during 1997. We exclude 
these observations from the sample for two reasons: 1) as it turns out, rate of repayment 
of arrears is unrelated to our variables of interest and 2) pooling the two subsamples (the 
one in which arrears rose and the one in which they fell) together and allowing only the 
coefficients of interest to differ is rejected by econometric tests. Evidently, the pattern of 
federal tax enforcement for companies that pay more to the government than just the flow 
of new-coming tax obligations follows a different rule than for companies that 
accumulate arrears. All explanatory variables are the same as in the previous 
specification and taken in 1996 (with the exception of the index of tensions of 
relationships between the governor and the federal center that is measured for 1997). The 
regression that contains this index may suffer from endogeneity problem because the fact 
that regional firms accumulate federal tax arrears creates tensions in relationships 
between authorities of two levels. We cannot eliminate this problem because there are no 
appropriate instruments. Thus, the alternative explanation that results based on this index 
are driven by reverse causality cannot be ruled out. One can only note that many 
 
15 Share of own revenues in total regional expenditures is available only for 1996. Regional output 
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components of the index (however, not all of them) were measured before 1997 and did 
not change in 1997. We include dummy for regional elections in 1997 to control for a 
possible political budget cycle.16 
The question that we address next is which enterprises have been granted 
authorized tax deferrals for a given level of tax arrears. We have data on official federal 
tax deferrals at the end of the first quarters of 1997 and 1998. Most firms did not receive 
a deferral, thus, we simultaneously estimate the probability that a firm is granted an 
authorized tax deferral and the size of the deferral relative to the stock of accumulated 
federal arrears (given that it is granted). Heckman’s estimation procedure was used with 
the following specifications for selection and size equations, respectively: 
iiiiii
iiii
iiiiii
iiii
ControlsEmploymentLogGRP_pcLogcomppolFedevenue_sharReg_own_re
ol_powerGovernor_poutputceivables/Overdue_reLogratioLiquidity_ockArrears_stwDelays_floLog
ControlsEmploymentLogtrationReg_ConcenGRP_pcLogcomppolFedevenue_sharReg_own_re
ol_powerGovernor_poutputceivables/Overdue_reLogratioLiquidity_wDelays_flowDelays_floP
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 (3) 
The list of explanatory variables in these specifications is very similar to the one in 
regressions for tax arrears. One important difference is that the list of regressors includes 
logarithm of employment to account for the firm size because in this case the natural 
choice for normalization is the stock of arrears, rather than enterprise size. Employment 
size, however, should be important for political reasons. Selection equation includes the 
full set of regressors while the size equation excludes regional output concentration, 
distance to Moscow, and electricity dummy because they have no explanatory power. We 
run regressions separately for deferrals in 1997 and 1998 and use lagged independent 
variables.  
                                                                                                                                                 
concentration is always taken in 1996 because it is very persistent and does not change over time. 
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Since many of our regressors in firm-level regressions are the same within each 
region, in all specifications discussed above we allow error terms to be clustered 
(correlated) within regions. Summary statistics for the variables used in regressions are in 
table A4 in appendix.  
 
4. Results 
Let us start with presentation of results about determinants of arrears (estimation 
of equations (1) and (2)). Table 1 presents results of the baseline regressions for the stock 
of arrears. The first result is that independent of liquidity measure used (absolute, quick, 
or current liquidity ratio, including or not including overdue receivables) we find that 
firms with liquidity problems have significantly higher stock of federal tax arrears in both 
years consistent with earlier findings of Alfandari and Schaffer (1996). A one standard 
deviation increase in the absolute liquidity ratio led to a decrease in the stock of arrears 
per ruble of output of 24% in 1.1.1997 and 18% in 1.1.1998.  
Second, controlling for firm’s liquidity, the hypothesis about regional resistance 
to paying federal taxes finds strong support in the data. The coefficients of indices 
measuring regional bargaining power with the center and tensions in relations of the 
governor with the center as well as political popularity of the governor are always 
positive (independent of specification) and significant except for the coefficient of the 
index of tensions of regional relations with the center in the regression for arrears in Jan 
1, 1997. A one standard deviation increase in the indices led to an increase in the stock of 
                                                                                                                                                 
16 See Alesina, Roubini and Cohen (1997) for a survey of the theoretical and empirical literature on 
electoral business cycles. For Russian evidence of political cycles consult Treisman and Gimpelson (2001) 
on federal elections and Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya (2003) on regional elections. 
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arrears of approximately 15%. A one standard deviation increase in the number of votes 
cast for the governor in the last elections led to an increase in the stock of arrears of 
approximately 10%. Regional output concentration is consistently positive (as Sonin’s 
model of provincial protectionism predicts) but almost never significant.17 The share of 
own revenues in total expenditures also does not have an effect on the stock of arrears. 
Third, neither GRP per capita nor the extent of electoral competition at the 
national level is significant (with the exception of one regression for Jan 1, 1998 where 
electoral competition is significant with the wrong sign). Thus, the data are not consistent 
with the story of federal redistribution. 
[Place Table 1 here.] 
Table 2 presents results of the baseline regressions for the flow of arrears. Again, 
all liquidity measures are strongly negatively significantly correlated with the federal 
arrears that were accumulated during the 1997. A one standard deviation increase in the 
absolute liquidity ratio led to a decrease in accumulation of arrears per ruble of output of 
about 25%. Indices of the bargaining power with central government and of tensions in 
relationships of the governor with the center are positive and strongly significant. So is 
the governor’s popularity. A one standard deviation increases in these variables led to 22, 
27, and 18% increases in the flow of arrears, respectively. The regional output 
concentration is consistently positive, but significant only in one out of four regressions 
of the baseline estimation. The share of own revenues is insignificant. Coefficient of the 
gross regional product per capita has negative sign in all specifications and, but becomes 
                                                 
17 In regressions for arrears in Jan 1, 1997, output concentration can be made significant by exclusion of 
measures of political bargaining between the center and the regions. In contrast, in regressions for Jan 1, 
1998, coefficients of the regional concentration are insignificant irrespective of specification. 
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significant only very infrequently (it is significant in one out of four baseline 
regressions). Effect of electoral competition at the federal level is zero. 
[Place Table 2 here.] 
Overall, lack of liquidity in firms did have an important effect on accumulation of 
federal tax arrears, consistent with LL hypothesis. Regional political resistance to federal 
tax collection also is an important determinant of both the stock and the flow of federal 
arrears. Moreover, political power of the regional governments (measured by governor’s 
political popularity and the indices of governor’s political relationship with center) turns 
out to be more important than regional industrial structure (measured by the level of 
industrial concentration) in explaining successful resistance. Unlike the other two 
hypotheses, hypothesis about redistribution nature of federal tax arrears is not robustly 
supported by the data. There is only very weak and unrobust evidence that federal arrears 
are higher in regions with lower level of gross regional product per capita.   
Let us turn to the discussion of determinants of authorized federal tax deferrals. 
Table 3 presents results for the baseline specification (estimation of the system of 
equations (3)). In contrast to the results for tax arrears, none of the liquidity measures is 
statistically significant in explaining either the incidence or the size of federal tax 
deferrals. There is also no robust significant relationship between the measures of 
regional political resistance and the size of tax deferrals (given that a deferral was 
granted).18 Yet, regional bargaining power and tensions in relationships of regional 
governments and the federal center were very important in determining the probability 
that a particular firm was granted a deferral. One standard deviation increases in the 
index of the tensions in relationships and in the index of bargaining power led to 
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increased in the probability to get an authorized deferral of about 4 and 6 percentage 
points, respectively. In addition, effect of political popularity is consistently positive and 
in selection equation for 1998 significant. Regional output concentration and regional 
own revenue share do not have an effect on the size or frequency of deferrals.  
[Place Table 3 here.] 
Granting an authorized tax deferral requires an action on behalf of the federal 
government. Thus, if there is any room for voluntary federal redistribution, we should see 
its evidence in these regressions most clearly. Indeed, we find that gross regional product 
per capita has robust negative effect on the size of deferrals in both years (absolute values 
of t-statistics in all specifications are greater than unity and in half of regressions 
coefficients are significant). There is, however, no robust relationship between GRP per 
capita and the probability for a regional firm to get a deferral. On the contrary, if at all, 
electoral competition seems to be important for the incidence of tax deferrals rather than 
their size. (Two out of four baseline regressions have significant positive coefficients of 
electoral competition in 1998.) One standard deviation increase in electoral competition 
increased the probability of a tax deferral by 2 percentage points. Finally, firm’s 
employment size comes out significantly positive in explaining probability to get an 
authorized deferral only in 1998. Overall, the results about authorized deferrals suggest 
that both the political bargaining of the regional governors and the center and the federal 
redistributive politics do play a role in determining the incidence of federal tax deferrals. 
The size of deferrals seems to be determined with economic redistribution objective in 
mind: firms in poorer regions got larger deferrals.  
                                                                                                                                                 
18 Only the power in relationships of regions with the center is positive and marginally significant in 
regressions for 1997. 
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 5. Conclusion 
This paper provides evidence that in the second half of 1990s liquidity problems 
in firms remained an important factor in escalation of federal tax arrears. Arrears were 
greater and accumulated faster in firms with liquidity problems. Enforcement of tax 
collection, however, varied greatly even for a given level of firms’ liquidity. Politically 
strong governors successfully resisted federal tax collection in their regions: federal 
arrears were higher and accumulated faster in regions where governors had larger popular 
base, regions that had better bargaining position vis-à-vis the center, and regions that had 
governors in open political opposition to the center. Moreover, these regions managed not 
only to disrupt federal government’s tax collection efforts; they also were successful in 
bargaining with the center for official tax deferrals on behalf of regional companies.  
While illiquid firms were unable to pay their federal tax obligations, the federal 
government did not bail them out directly with the use of authorized tax deferrals. This 
suggests that the federal government apart from a political objectives of not liquidating 
failing firms pursued fiscal objectives of attempting to enforce tax collection where it was 
possible. Instead of bailing out firms with liquidity problems, federal government 
allocated tax deferrals strategically to firms in regions with larger numbers of “swing” 
voters.  
The main lesson from the empirical exercise of this paper is that Russia’s federal 
structure and, more precisely, weakness of the central government enforcement at the 
level of Federation Subjects was one of the fundamental reasons for accumulation of 
 25
federal tax arrears and collapse of federal government revenues in the second half of 
1990s. 
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Table 1: Stock of federal arrears
-6.187 -6.313 -7.396 -6.428 -5.986 -6.071 -6.133 -6.072
[1.695]*** [1.626]*** [1.331]*** [1.587]*** [0.841]*** [0.809]*** [0.804]*** [0.819]***
0.147 0.159
[0.062]** [0.051]***
0.055 0.092
[0.048] [0.036]**
0.015 0.005
[0.004]*** [0.003]*
0.100 -0.198
[0.236] [0.153]
0.004 0.004 -0.002 0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.005 -0.006
[0.005] [0.006] [0.005] [0.005] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003]*
0.212 0.196 0.202 0.221 -0.237 -0.299 -0.148 -0.126
[0.203] [0.200] [0.161] [0.253] [0.183] [0.190] [0.163] [0.199]
0.445 0.603 0.897 0.663 0.112 0.172 0.438 0.522
[0.526] [0.564] [0.486]* [0.506] [0.315] [0.329] [0.345] [0.418]
-0.010 -0.039 -0.007 -0.069 0.322 0.386 0.305 0.392
[0.115] [0.125] [0.106] [0.134] [0.094]*** [0.103]*** [0.092]*** [0.098]***
0.031 0.032 0.032 0.041 0.133 0.145 0.132 0.123
[0.051] [0.052] [0.048] [0.056] [0.058]** [0.061]** [0.062]** [0.061]**
-1.590 -1.660 -1.446 -1.658 -1.056 -1.125 -1.066 -1.128
[0.194]*** [0.198]*** [0.190]*** [0.199]*** [0.220]*** [0.220]*** [0.214]*** [0.217]***
0.421 0.411 0.420 0.400 0.105 0.090 0.125 0.097
[0.126]*** [0.126]*** [0.126]*** [0.127]*** [0.104] [0.104] [0.110] [0.107]
Two-digit industry dummies *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
Observations 776.000 776.000 771.000 776.000 1164.000 1164.000 1154.000 1164.000
R-squared 0.200 0.200 0.220 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.190 0.190
Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the regional level are in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Electricity
Military
Regional own tax revenues as a share of 
total regional expenditures
Log gross regional product per capita
Regional elections dummy
Log distance to Moscow
Regional output concentration
Log arrears per ruble of output, stock (Jan 1, 1997) Log arrears per ruble of output, stock (Jan 1, 1998)
Electoral competition at the federal 
level
Tensions in relations of governor with 
the center index
Votes for governor in last elections
Absolute liquidity ratio
Regional barganing power index
 
Table 2: Flow of tax arrears
-6.526 -6.601 -6.542 -6.783
[1.864]*** [1.895]*** [1.840]*** [1.855]***
0.241
[0.079]***
0.179
[0.051]***
0.008
[0.004]**
0.17
[0.219]
0.000 0.003 -0.004 -0.002
[0.005] [0.005] [0.006] [0.006]
-0.331 -0.471 -0.253 -0.296
[0.227] [0.226]** [0.209] [0.244]
0.336 0.28 1.109 0.719
[0.677] [0.698] [0.602]* [0.724]
-0.28 -0.23 -0.366 -0.36
[0.136]** [0.135]* [0.151]** [0.152]**
-0.109 -0.005 -0.244 -0.132
[0.178] [0.188] [0.176] [0.174]
0.022 0.023 0.015 0.025
[0.076] [0.069] [0.071] [0.074]
-0.952 -1.087 -1.03 -1.119
[0.227]*** [0.224]*** [0.215]*** [0.214]***
0.216 0.208 0.237 0.201
[0.201] [0.199] [0.207] [0.208]
Two-digit industry dummies *** *** *** ***
Observations 476 476 475 476
R-squared 0.17 0.18 0.16 0.16
Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the regional level are in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Log flow of arrears per ruble of output, 1997
Regional elections dummy, 96
Log distance to Moscow
Electricity
Regional output concentration
Military
Regional elections dummy, 97
Absolute liquidity ratio
Regional barganing power index
Tensions in relations of governor with the 
center index
Votes for governor in last elections
Regional own tax revenues as a share of 
total regional expenditures
Log gross regional product per capita
Electoral competition at the federal level
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Table 3: Flow of authorized tax deferals
0.903 2.696 0.352 1.229 -5.561 -5.769 -5.725 -6.095
[4.606] [4.946] [5.478] [5.224] [5.464] [5.523] [5.443] [5.698]
0.739 0.174
[0.410]* [0.526]
0.155 -0.190
[0.182] [0.218]
-0.019 -0.011
[0.019] [0.035]
0.397 -1.095
[0.876] [0.697]
-0.002 -0.003 -0.005 -0.010 0.008 0.000 0.009 0.002
[0.017] [0.017] [0.017] [0.016] [0.013] [0.013] [0.012] [0.013]
-0.889 -1.022 -0.763 -0.927 -0.838 -0.587 -0.735 -0.638
[0.589] [0.568]* [0.611] [0.583] [0.431]* [0.455] [0.368]** [0.346]*
Log employment 0.065 0.062 0.008 0.005 -0.105 -0.104 -0.117 -0.106
[0.189] [0.190] [0.251] [0.241] [0.256] [0.248] [0.276] [0.238]
-0.519 -0.373 -0.446 -0.391 -1.669 -1.574 -1.472 -1.487
[0.479] [0.528] [0.550] [0.493] [0.654]**[0.598]*** [0.762]* [0.550]***
-0.751 -0.778 -0.946 -0.894 -0.613 -0.533 -0.611 -0.421
[0.331]** [0.389]** [0.451]** [0.350]** [0.351]* [0.354] [0.385] [0.304]
Constant 7.032 9.750 10.607 10.214 10.157 9.131 10.320 10.492
[6.325] [5.679]* [6.519] [6.667] [3.645]***[3.742]** [4.224]**[3.244]***
Uncensored obs. 108.000 108.000 108.000 107.000 116.000 116.000 115.000 116.000
0.837 0.854 1.487 0.553 -0.122 -0.405 -0.223 -0.475
[1.695] [1.745] [1.721] [1.712] [1.726] [1.599] [2.687] [1.670]
Regional barganing power index 0.342 0.542
[0.138]** [0.115]***
0.181 0.275
[0.085]** [0.070]***
0.010 0.072
[0.009] [0.017]***
-0.108 0.445
[0.497] [0.216]**
0.007 0.010 0.002 0.004 0.010 0.012 -0.002 0.007
[0.009] [0.010] [0.008] [0.009] [0.005]** [0.005]** [0.009] [0.004]
0.064 -0.015 0.105 0.190 -0.119 -0.294 -0.065 -0.081
[0.263] [0.233] [0.266] [0.323] [0.209] [0.197] [0.772] [0.192]
Log employment 0.127 0.128 0.127 0.121 0.087 0.091 0.104 0.084
[0.098] [0.097] [0.098] [0.102] [0.056] [0.055]* [0.057]* [0.052]
0.219 0.366 1.068 1.035 0.336 0.459 1.797 0.883
[1.047] [1.102] [0.891] [0.706] [0.709] [0.531] [1.551] [0.605]
-0.039 -0.055 -0.094 -0.142 -0.152 0.074 -1.014 0.062
[0.233] [0.205] [0.203] [0.206] [0.198] [0.149] [0.570]* [0.144]
0.353 0.284 0.319 0.256 0.128 0.017 0.507 -0.019
[0.249] [0.255] [0.254] [0.264] [0.300] [0.282] [0.235]** [0.288]
0.020 0.036 0.010 0.010 -0.140 -0.082 -0.213 -0.082
[0.105] [0.097] [0.086] [0.097] [0.098] [0.086] [0.183] [0.063]
-0.851 -0.933 -0.885 -0.945 -6.240 -6.472 -7.160 -6.400
[0.283]***[0.288]***[0.251]***[0.253]*** [0.146]***[0.165]***[0.507]***[0.131]***
Constant -3.494 -2.648 -3.893 -3.775 -0.934 0.609 -5.432 -1.145
[2.130] [1.974] [2.331]* [2.259]* [1.893] [1.768] [6.747] [1.636]
Total obs. 767.000 767.000 761.000 767.000 1254.000 1254.000 1240.000 1254.000
Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the regional level are in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Electricity
Regional own tax revenues as a share 
of total regional expenditures
Log gross regional product per capita
Regional elections dummy
Military
Regional output concentration
Tensions in relations of governor 
with the center index
Votes for governor in last elections
Log distance to Moscow
Absolute liquidity ratio
Electoral competition at the federal 
level
Regional own tax revenues as a share 
of total regional expenditures
Log gross regional product per capita
Regional elections dummy
Military
Electoral competition at the federal 
level
Absolute liquidity ratio
Regional barganing power index
Tensions in relations of governor 
with the center index
Votes for governor in last elections
Size equations
Selection equations
Deferrals > 0 vs. Deferrals = 0 Deferrals > 0 vs. Deferrals = 0
Log flow of officially deferred federal 
taxes (Apr 1, 97) per ruble of the stock of 
federal arrears (Jan 1, 97)
Log flow of officially deferred federal 
taxes (Apr 1, 98) per ruble of the stock of 
federal arrears (Jan 1, 98) 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1. Industrial distribution of firms in the sample 
  Number of firms: 
industry 
code: industry name: 1.1.97 1.1.98 
181 Flavoring 44 130 
141 Engineering (turbine, cables, refrigerators) 74 106 
113 Coal 85 100 
147 Other engineering (defense, aviation, ship building) 49 92 
151 Logging 28 86 
111 Electricity 74 82 
161 Construction materials 27 63 
131 Chemical 51 59 
143 Instrument engineering 50 59 
121 Ferrous metallurgy 45 56 
112 Fuel industry (oil and gas) 40 51 
171 Textile 30 46 
149 Repair 23 44 
152 Wood-working 9 32 
133 Petrochemical 22 30 
142 Machine building tool manufacturing 14 21 
144 Tractors, agricultural equipment 18 21 
153 Wood-pulp industry 10 19 
122 Non-ferrous metallurgy 11 16 
145 Road, construction and public utilities 13 14 
183 Fish 10 14 
148 Metal construction 6 13 
173 Tanning, fur, boot, shoe 5 13 
165 Glass, porcelain 3 12 
146 Engineering for light and food industry, home appliances 6 11 
162 Facing material 1 10 
124 Noble metals diamonds 4 9 
182 Meat and Dairy 2 9 
191 Microbiology 2 8 
192 Flour-grinding 3 6 
125 Non-ferrous metalworking 2 4 
172 Sewing 1 3 
193 Medical 2 3 
197 Other 6 4 
123 Rare-metals and semi-conducting materials 1 2 
127 Electrode 3 2 
154 Resin 0 2 
114 Shale 1 1 
128 Refractory and high temp. metal alloys 0 1 
 Total 776 1254 
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Table A2. Regional distribution of firms in the sample 
 # of firms:   # of firms: 
 1.1.97 1.1.98   1.1.97 1.1.98 
Adygeya republic 2 2  Murmansk oblast 12 10 
Altai krai 14 23  Nizhny Novgorod oblast 32 40 
Amur oblast 2 3  North Osetiya republic 0 4 
Arkhangelsk oblast 13 33  Novgorod oblast 1 3 
Astrakhan oblast 2 2  Novosibirsk oblast 10 19 
Bashkortostan republic 20 29  Omsk oblast 9 10 
Belgorod oblast 6 18  Orenburg oblast 18 21 
Bryansk oblast 9 12  Oryol oblast 0 4 
Buryat republic 2 5  Penza oblast 11 13 
Chelyabinsk oblast 54 63  Perm oblast 19 46 
Chita oblast 4 5  Primorskii krai 11 19 
Chuvash republic 4 10  Pskov oblast 3 3 
Evrei autonomous oblast 1 1  Rostov oblast 21 17 
Irkutsk oblast 20 22  Ryazan oblast 7 14 
Ivanovo oblast 21 34  Sakha (Yakutia) republic 6 9 
Kabardino-Balkar republic 4 3  Sakhalin oblast 14 26 
Kaliningrad oblast 3 5  Samara oblast 17 22 
Kaluga oblast 4 8  Saratov oblast 14 15 
Kamchatka oblast 6 6  Smolensk oblast 6 5 
Karachaevo-Cherkess republic 0 1  St. Petersburg city 10 35 
Karelia republic 9 13  Stavropol krai 5 17 
Kemerovo oblast 64 110  Sverdlovsk oblast 7 54 
Khabarovsk krai 13 19  Tambov oblast 9 16 
Khakasia republic 13 13  Tatarstan republic 12 21 
Kirov oblast 17 25  Tomsk oblast 5 12 
Komi republic 9 19  Tula oblast 12 17 
Kostroma oblast 6 17  Tver oblast 9 13 
Krasnodar krai 11 13  Tyumen oblast 10 27 
Krasnoyarsk krai 21 31  Ulyanovsk oblast 10 12 
Kurgan oblast 6 9  Ulyanovsk oblast 0 11 
Kursk oblast 8 12  Vladimir oblast 12 25 
Leningrad oblast 4 10  Volgograd oblast 20 24 
Lipetsk oblast 2 4  Vologda oblast 9 13 
Magadan oblast 12 11  Voronezh oblast 21 26 
Mari-El republic 5 9  Yaroslavl oblast 20 23 
Mordovia republic 3 8  Total 776 1254 
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   Table A3. Summary statistics for federal arrears and authorized deferrals 
 1.1.1998 1.1.1997 
Federal tax arrears (billion rubles) 
Observations 2,288 1,325 
Median 5,877 5,618 
Mean 18,012.1 23,674.3 
Std. Deviation 78,385.3 111,313.8 
Min 2 1 
Max 2,830,869 2,855,191 
Authorized federal tax deferrals (billion rubles) 
Observations 2,633 1,323 
Median 0 0 
Mean 2,278.5 3,483.8 
Std. Deviation 29,349.4 29,589.4 
Min 0 0 
Max 955,633 619,078 
  Note: The summary statistics in this table are calculated for the whole sample of firms.  
  (Regressions contain fewer observations because there are no data for many of these firms) 
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Table A4. Summary statistics of variables used in regressions analysis: 
Variable Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
Log arrears per ruble of output, stock, 1.1.97 776 -3.040 1.288 -8.047 0.391 
Log arrears per ruble of output, stock, 1.1.98 1164 -2.424 1.241 -6.164 0.734 
Log flow of arrears per ruble of output, 1997 476 -2.936 1.321 -7.709 3.843 
Log flow of authorized deferrals per ruble of 
arrears stock, 4.1.1997, if deferrals granted 108 -0.189 2.014 -6.959 9.625 
Log flow of authorized deferrals per ruble of 
arrears stock, 4.1.1998, if deferrals granted 116 0.554 2.263 -6.310 7.601 
Dummy for "deferrals granted," 1997 767 0.141 0.348 0 1 
Dummy for "deferrals granted," 1998 1254 0.093 0.290 0 1 
Index of tensions in relations of governor 
with the center, 1997 1254 3.216 1.398 1 5 
Index of regional bargaining power, 1996 1254 2.187 0.842 1 3 
Votes for governor in the last regional 
elections, 1997 1240 64.049 15.870 30.760 99.425 
Votes for governor in the last regional 
elections, 1996 1240 55.260 20.700 16.600 98.500 
Regional own tax revenues as a share of total 
regional expenditures 1254 1.231 0.289 0.220 1.820 
Electoral competition at the federal level, 
1996  1254 -20.620 14.972 -59.033 -0.034 
Concentration of output among the largest 
regional firms, 1996 1254 0.189 0.103 0.105 0.622 
Absolute liquidity ratio, end of year, 1996 1241 0.020 0.044 0.000000457 0.513 
Absolute liquidity ratio, end of year, 1997 1164 0.010 0.034 2.18E-08 0.538 
Regional elections dummy, 1996 1254 0.525 0.500 0 1 
Regional elections dummy, 1997 1254 0.186 0.389 0 1 
Electricity industry 1254 0.065 0.247 0 1 
Log distance to Moscow 1254 7.187 1.018 5.118 9.382 
Log gross regional product per capita, 1996 1254 9.393 0.388 7.981 10.964 
Log gross regional product per capita, 1997 1254 9.548 0.405 8.542 11.089 
Military sector 1254 0.110 0.313 0 1 
Note: Control variables are summarized for the maximum sample used in regression analysis.  
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